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 Interview Board Member: Now Miss Murphy, just one final
 question. I suppose you are aware that there has been a lot
 of talk recently about the values and ethos of a school and
 the need for teachers employed in the school to reflect that
 ethos in their lifestyle. What is your own view on this whole
 question?
 Miss Murphy: Hm . . . well . . . Can I be frank?
 Interview Board Member: By all means, please do!
 Miss Murphy: / think it's an exceptionally complex question.
 As I see it, the school authorities have long standing rights
 which must be taken seriously and parents too have very
 important rights which are enshrined in our Constitution.
 But teachers and pupils also have rights which must be taken
 seriously and if this is the case then neither the rights of the
 parents nor of the school authorities are absolute. In other
 words, what I'm trying to say is that there is no easy answer
 to the question, but there is a clear need for the various
 parties to sit down and attempt to thrash out in open
 discussion some kind of code; the kind of code which might
 win a substantial and genuine commitment among the
 parties. Otherwise I think we have a recipe for smouldering
 dissatisfaction and recurring conflict. The real losers then
 are the pupils. I think they're very quick to sense the slightest
 tension in the atmosphere.
 Interview Board Member: / see!
 I
 SOME PREVAILING CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS
 I shall begin by asking the reader to consider whether Miss Murphy's
 forthrightness and style of argument should help in securing for her the
 post for which she was a candidate or whether her remarks identify
 her as a potential troublemaker of whom a prudent school manage
 P?draig Hogan, a native of Caltra, Co. Galway, lectures in Educa
 tion at St Patrick's College, Maynooth.
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 ment should be wary. The reader may well reply that the information
 supplied is too slight to provide the basis for a valid judgement. I am
 quite aware of this and I should stress that there is no attempt here to
 force the reader prematurely to nail his or her colours publicly to the
 mast. Reading, indeed, affords one the opportunity of a private and
 privileged conversation with a text. I say privileged because whereas
 the argument presented in the text is already publicly fixed in print,
 the response of the reader does not have to be public and can be
 revised and carefully considered in the privacy of one's own arm
 chair or study before any public judgement on the argument is offered
 by the reader.
 Now, although the short extract from the interview quoted above
 does not give a comprehensive picture of either the interview board or
 the candidate, it touches briefly on a very live issue; an issue which
 has been and continues to be of central importance in very many
 interviews for teaching posts in Ireland.1 I am inclined to think that
 many readers may be familiar enough with the kind of question asked
 by the interview board member although I also suspect that the
 answer of the interviewee would generally be much more circum
 spect than that of our fictitious Miss Murphy. All the more reason
 then that the reader might take a few moments at this point to
 examine the character of his or her own reaction to Miss Murphy's
 remarks to the Board. Would we welcome the kind of thinking her
 remarks reveal? Would it make us vaguely uneasy? Would we find
 ourselves rejecting it?
 Perhaps the dialogue at the start might evoke many more kinds of
 reaction than the three broad classes I have listed, but for the present,
 I shall confine myself to a brief examination of the three mentioned
 and how they bear on our perceptions of what constitutes the ethos of
 a school, or college or an educational ethos more generally. Taking
 the last reaction first, namely the standpoint which rejects the kind of
 thinking represented by Miss Murphy's remarks, what can be said
 about this standpoint? In answer to our question here it can be
 pointed out that this attitude is a coherent and logical one for any
 educational authority which sees the issue of school ethos primarily in
 terms of the compliance of all employed in the school with the
 officially sanctioned standards and requirements of the school
 authorities. This view of school ethos has perhaps been the most
 common one in Ireland where it has traditionally been associated
 1. In the past, applicants for posts in schools under the ownership or the control of
 Catholic Church authorities were frequently asked explicit questions about their
 religious practices. The period after Vatican II, particularly the 1970's, saw a decline
 in the frequency of this type of question at interviews. Reports from numerous job
 applicants in recent months however, suggest that this practice has re-emerged on a
 large scale in recent times.
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 with the outlooks of religious or other school authorities.2 It is worth
 noting however, that there is nothing particularly Irish about this
 conception of school ethos. For instance this view is the prevailing
 one in the Soviet Union, where the ruling party's version of Marxism
 supplies the officially sanctioned standard for schools. Paul
 Goodman, the distinguished American writer on education, has
 pointed out that a peculiar version of democracy was also sanctioned
 widely as an orthodox creed for schools in the United States in the
 nineteen fifties.3 In West Germany moreover, all teachers have to
 make a pledge renouncing communism before they can be employed.
 Perhaps the adjective 'custodial' best describes this conception of
 school ethos. In other words, the authorities of the school or educa
 tional system view themselves largely as custodians of a set of
 standards, which are to be preserved, defended and transmitted
 through the agency of schools and colleges. An important point arises
 from this and it calls for emphasis: Insofar as an attitude of
 custodianship is uppermost in our minds we will tend continually to
 be on the lookout for infringements and to be suspicious also of an
 independent questioning attitude, such as that shown by Miss
 Murphy. This custodial conception of ethos can rightly claim
 authoritative warrant from Plato's Republic, particularly books II
 and III, where a forceful argument is advanced for protecting youth
 from influences considered undesirable: from certain ideas and life
 styles which they might inevitably encounter during the course of
 their education, but for the maintenance of a vigilant and effective
 censorship by the educational authorities. Guardianship as an educa
 tional theme is extolled in the Republic and is central also in the
 enduring educational legacy of Plato; a legacy which has, in varying
 degrees, been embraced by different traditions of Western
 Christianity. As my purpose at this point is one of description rather
 than one of appraisal it would be an error to read either approval or
 disapproval of Plato or of the custodial conception of schools ethos
 into the foregoing observations. Before any appraisal is attempted
 one must first attempt to bring to light, within the limits of space and
 one's own ability, an accurate account of the conceptions one wishes
 to consider, together with an indication of the philosophical origins or
 antecedents of these conceptions.
 Turning now to the second reaction, that of a certain uneasiness
 evoked by the views expressed by Miss Murphy, what can be said of
 this response? The first thing I would venture to say, although I am
 2. The tendency here has been to identify ethos with the substance of the statutes or
 rules which officially govern the college or school. This point will be examined
 further in the text of the essay.
 3. Paul Goodman Compulsory Miseducation and The Community of Scholars,
 Random House 1964.
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 guessing here, is that it is probably a much more widespread response
 nowadays than the former one. Uneasiness, ambiguity and a measure
 of confusion frequently attend the deliberations and decisions of
 educational authorities who regard school work as a community
 activity but who operate in a network of pressures and constraints
 which is very often inflexible, or authoritarian, or both. A second
 point for emphasis arises here and it is as follows: Insofar as the
 accommodation of various educational pressure groups is uppermost
 in our minds we will tend to aim for an expedient settlement of the
 matter rather than a thorough tackling of the matter. Thus, provoca
 tive suggestions for radical reappraisals of the status quo, such as that
 contained in Miss Murphy's statement, are likely to cause some
 unease. The extent of such unease will vary in accordance with the
 weight already given in one's mind to the viewpoints of the authori
 ties, statutory or traditional, with which such a proposal is likely to
 clash.
 This accommodating concept of ethos has its origins mainly in
 practical experience, or more precisely, in the effects of years of
 practice in the politics of educational administration. It is not to be
 confused with a democratic reconciliation of differences, unless one
 accepts that democracy is to be understood as the artful amassing of
 ingenuity, publicity and any available precedent behind the interests
 of a particular lobby. Reconciliation and accommodation are quite
 different matters, as we shall have reason to argue later, but suffice it
 to anticipate here that whereas reconciliation involves a change of
 heart properly so called, accommodation is a concept governed
 mainly by pragmatic, expedient or ad hoc considerations. By way of
 brief illustration of the kind of tendency inherent in the attitude of
 accommodation, it is worth recalling that Kierkegaard, in his famous
 Attack Upon 'Christendom', was primarily exposing a Christianity
 which had accommodated itself to the sensibilities of self-regarding
 respectability in prominent 19th century Danish society and had thus
 ultimately given itself an ethos which was quite at odds with its own
 historical origins as a religion.4 The kinds of school ethos brought
 about by a habit of accommodation have become increasingly
 prevalent in Ireland in recent decades, particularly with the rise of a
 variety of articulate interest groups in education.
 The third reaction calling for our attention is that which welcomed
 the observations made by Miss Murphy in her reply to the final
 interview question. What conception of educational ethos might
 4. Kierkegaard's critique of the 'accommodating' mentality is particularly severe in
 his Attack Upon 'Christendom', translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton University
 Press, 1943, 1968. See for instance pages 34 and 35. See also his The Point of View
 for My Work as an Author, translated by Walter Lowrie and edited by Benjamin
 Nelson, Harper & Row Torchbooks, 1962, particularly pp. 22-27.
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 underlie this reaction? Reflecting on this question it soon becomes
 clear that the kind of outlook presupposed in this reaction is quite
 different from the other two. The main difference is as follows.
 Whereas the first two conceptions see ethos primarily in terms of
 implementing the standards of traditional authorities, or
 accommodating the demands of various interest groups, the third
 conception sees ethos primarily as the natural outcome of what
 actually goes on in school or college from day to day, perhaps regard
 less of what kind of standard the school is formally thought to
 represent. As in the two former cases a point also arises here for
 particular emphasis: Insofar as dialogue, as a way of life, is
 uppermost in our thoughts and actions, we will tend to have a
 receptive ear ? but a critically alert ear ? for viewpoints different
 from our own; we will accordingly be willing to put the correctness of
 our own current viewpoint at risk in the disciplined life of dialogue.
 The philosophical roots of this third conception can be found in the
 writings of Martin Buber and, in a particular way, in the life of
 Socrates.
 II
 AN APPRAISAL AND A RECOMMENDATION
 Let us now attempt a review or an appraisal of the various
 conceptions of educational ethos outlined. In regard to the first one,
 the custodial conception, I have suggested that this has been the most
 prevalent understanding of ethos in educational circles in Ireland in
 the past. It is a conception which is still widespread, and, from judge
 ments recently handed down by the Courts it would seem to be the
 only conception of ethos acknowledged by the judiciary.5 It is worth
 noting in this connection that unlike other Western countries, the
 practice of legal hermeneutics, as distinct from custodianship of the
 letter of the original statute, has not been a prominent feature of Irish
 law in the last decade or so.
 THE CUSTODIAL CONCEPTION
 To call the custodial conception of educational ethos a conservative
 one would not, however, be accurate, unless one adds to Michael
 Oakeshott's description of conservatism ? 'a disposition appropriate
 to a man who is acutely aware of having something to lose which he
 5. See reports of two law cases in recent years where dismissals of teachers by
 Church authorities were appealed and lost (i) Maynooth dismissals; Supreme Court
 judgement delivered on 1 November 1979, and reported in daily papers of
 November 2. The full text of the High Court judgement in this case was printed in
 The Irish Times, 15 August 1978. (ii) New Ross dismissal. Circuit Court judgement
 delivered on 4 July 1984 and reported in daily papers of July 5.
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 has learned to care for'6 ? the following qualification. What one has
 learned to care for has largely become fixed in an officially sanc
 tioned pattern of interpretation. This qualification calls to mind once
 again the strict requirements which Plato insisted the Quadrians of
 his educational state should meet in interpreting for the young the
 works of Homer and Hesiod, and the cultural accomplishments of
 Attic civilization more generally. So perverse indeed did Plato regard
 the ethos in the degenerate Attic democracy of his day that he would
 allow the Guardians of the purified state outlined in the Republic to
 employ pseudos, or deceit inspired by noble sentiment, in their efforts
 to implement the ethos he envisaged.7 It emerges clearly from the
 Republic that Plato saw ethos primarily in terms of the implementa
 tion of precept and the acquiescence of all in this event.
 From these observations it should not be thought that custodial
 conceptions of educational ethos necessarily involve 'justified
 deceitfulness'. What is more significant about a custodial mentality in
 educational matters is its un-historical character, despite its declared
 concern for the welfare of succeeding generations. An unyielding
 attachment to a fixed outlook on the world fails, almost invariably, to
 appreciate the nature of historical change or to respond appro
 priately to the challenges thrown up by an irreversible and even
 frenetic march of events. Where social changes are particularly
 marked, a custodianship which is austere, or fastidious, or otherwise
 rigid in disposition, can rapidly become partisan. There are important
 lessons to be learned in this matter from the history of education, not
 least in our own country in the last century-and-a-half, down to the
 present day. The more unfortunate effects of a custodial concept of
 educational ethos are brought home to the enquirer in any serious
 study of this period.8
 6. Michael Oakeshott: 'On Being Conserative' in his Rationalism in Politics and
 Other Essays, Methuen, 1962, p. 169.
 7. Republic, Book III; 389 b, c, and 414 d to 415 d.
 8. For an examination of the enmity and mutual mistrust which regularly attended
 the growth of the educational system in Ireland since its formal origins at primary
 level in 1831 see the following texts:
 (i) D. H. Akenson. The Irish Education Experiment: the National System oj
 Education in the 19th century, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
 (ii) D. H. Akenson. Education and Enmity: The Control of Schooling in
 Northern Ireland 1920-1950, Newton Abbott, David & Charles, 1973.
 (iii) T. J. O'Connell. One Hundred Years of Progress - The History of the INTO,
 INTO, 1968.
 (iv) P. J. Corish (ed.) A History of Irish Catholicism, Gill & McMillan, Vol. 5,
 1971, Chapter 6. Catholic Education: See contributions of I. Murphy and S.
 V. ? S?illeabh?in.
 (v) J. Coolahan Irish Education: history and structure, Institute of Public
 Administration, 1981.
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 THE ATTITUDE OF ACCOMMODATION
 The second conception to be considered is the one which views ethos
 as the accommodation of various interests. It is difficult to distinguish
 this kind of ethos from that of politics at local or parliamentary, shop
 floor or board-room level. Though this may well be disputed, a strong
 argument can be made that the primary practical concern of this kind
 of politics ? unlike the Politics of Aristotle ? is the achievement and
 exercise of power. That is not to say that this is its only concern.
 Clearly, important goals of a social, economic, commercial or other
 nature are put forward and pursued, but such goals characteristically
 become modified or distorted in response to various pressures which
 must be accommodated if the incumbent's hold on the office of power
 is not to become jeopardised. Well-known terms such as 'horse
 trading', 'sniffing the wind', 'jockeying for position', 'going for the
 jugular', etc, which are part of the everyday language of political and
 commercial life, reveal the pervasive influence of the opportunistic
 and the expedient as the presuppositions of this kind of discourse and
 action.
 Whatever may be said about the merits or demerits of this kind of
 thought and procedure in the spheres of commerce and politics ? and
 such an appraisal is not our purpose here ? I would argue that as far
 as the conduct of education is concerned the ethos engendered by the
 attitude of accommodation is largely an unhealthy one. It is
 unhealthy chiefly for the reason that it promotes a widespread
 misunderstanding of what the enterprise of education is about, and
 accordingly, imports procedural and administrative concepts from
 the spheres of politics and commerce which are quite inappropriate. If
 the essential business of education were the pursuit of some very
 tangible objective such as a higher index for profits or a lower index
 for inflation, then one could perhaps see how an attitude of
 accommodation might seek to make a plausible case for itself, for in
 such an instance the person who stays in power or gets promoted is
 generally the person who can simply claim to have delivered the
 goods and to have pacified or contained objectors along the way.
 Where 'the goods' in education come to be regarded primarily as
 tangibles such as grades or scores in public examinations, the stage is
 then set for the kind of administrative style we have just been
 considering, and perspectives which are distinctively educational tend
 to get obscured. The attitude of accommodation resists any funda
 mental questioning of the status quo which it seeks to maintain, even
 if it is a status quo to which few are deeply committed. In any case,
 educational ideas and procedures which are qualitatively different
 (such as we shall examine next) tend to get redefined in terms of the
 values of the prevailing system and thus lose their distinctive flavour
 and challenge. Failing that, they are often accorded a conciliatory
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 dignity as 'interesting alternatives' or 'ideas good in principle'. Only
 occasionally nowadays are they rejected out of hand as ridiculous or
 crazy.
 An impressive performance in a competitive examination,
 whatever about its acclaimed 'index' value, is not a reliable indica
 tion of a person's enrichment as a result of education. Where the
 competition is particularly intense the demands of such a perform
 ance and the climate in which it is achieved may often have quite
 injurious consequences from an educational viewpoint. Whereas a
 policy of accommodation may succeed in keeping overt conflict at
 bay for long periods it tends nevertheless to engender an ethos where
 an insidious estrangement (self-alienation) of those affected by that
 ethos can become a widespread but unacknowledged occurrence. In
 this sense, despite the most impressive delivery of goods, this type of
 ethos often succeeds in promoting an ascendancy of the unremark
 able or the mediocre.9
 THE ETHOS OF WHAT ACTUALLY GOES ON
 The third conception now calls for our attention. I have identified the
 roots of this conception with Buber and Socrates, but before
 exploring what they have to say, I would like to recall a thought of
 Aristotle's which once arrested my attention and which penetrated
 my own thinking with remarkable force the more I dwelt upon it. In
 Book II of his Ethics Aristotle points out that, fundamentally, what
 constitutes an ethos arises spontaneously from natural habit, i.e. from
 what has become habitual, or second nature, in one's daily dealings
 with one's associates.10 We have become so accustomed to thinking
 of ethos as something imposed from above or as the embodiment of
 some officially sanctioned code of behaviour that Aristotle's illumina
 tion of the original sense of the word may strike us strangely at first.
 So let us elucidate the point with an example from some notable
 political conflicts in the world at present. When we think of Poland,
 or of many Latin American countries, we initially think of a totali
 tarian ethos of one kind or another. (The ideological genesis of the
 totalitarianism is not the issue here.) Yet when we think of the manner
 in which the spirit of so many downtrodden people in such countries
 spontaneously and habitually manifests itself, we see the emergence
 of a different and perhaps much more significant ethos.
 Returning to the question of educational ethos, we can now clearly
 see that there can be more than one ethos in a school or college. It
 9. I have explored this issue of mediocrity, or averageness from a slightly different
 perspective in an article in The Crane Bag ? The Forum Issue, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1984,
 pp. 41-50. The article deals with secondary education in Ireland in the modern
 period. The title which appears over it is: 'An Overview of the Educational Ethos'.
 10. Ethics, Book II; particularly sections (i) and (ii).
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 may even be the case that the official ethos might sometimes
 command the respect of only a minority of the staff and students.
 Competition, for example, builds its own ethos, to an extent which
 may be infectious, sometimes even overwhelming. So do suspicion,
 enmity and resentment. So indeed does the spirit of fraternity and
 reconciliation. The important question here is not so much: does the
 actual ethos among staff and students reflect the standards of the
 school authorities or, can it be brought into line with, or somehow
 accommodated to, such a standard? Such questions would bring us
 back to the second conception considered, and perhaps even to the
 first. Rather the questions which need to be asked seem to me to be as
 follows: Is the ethos which actually prevails among staff and students
 generally such that it engenders a fruitful cultivation of intellect and a
 fluency in some art or skill? Does it achieve a liberation of imagina
 tion to value the possible more than the actual? or a deepening of self
 understanding, vis-a-vis others who are differently circumstanced?
 Does it communicate a grasp of what responding to a spiritual
 inheritance actually involves? Bearing in mind these questions let us
 explore more closely the notion of dialogue.
 Dialogue, as a way of life, is not something one encounters very
 often, despite the fact that the word has become almost banal in
 everyday discourse. Dialogue, properly understood, is not a strategy
 for resolving crises at meetings of conflicting interest groups. Such a
 conception reveals a singularly impoverished understanding of
 dialogue. Much more profoundly, dialogue is a disciplined, enduring
 disposition in one's heart and in one's outlook. Its effort is to be
 deeply and universally fraternal. Accordingly, dialogue cannot be
 dogmatic or artfully accommodating. What therefore, one may ask,
 is the attitude of dialogue to tradition or to a network of conflicting
 demands? Dialogue has a profound sense of indebtedness to tradi
 tion. Unlike the custodial standpoint which attempts to apply a fixed
 picture of the Good to the circumstances of the present, dialogue
 listens to tradition and asks: in what way might the wisdom which
 resides in tradition shed light on the different circumstances thrown
 up by the present? This indeed is no empty formula. Rather it is quite
 a demanding task. For instance, the tackling of an issue of social
 justice in modern society may require one to read deeply into
 Classical, Christian, Marxist or other traditions, not in search of
 some expedient compromise, but rather for an adequate understand
 ing of the nature of the points at issue. It is worth remembering that
 every literature which has become a tradition, originally saw itself as
 an attempt to put forward a valid claim to truth, and this has not
 altered with history. The study of tradition illustrates moreover that
 the intention of truth often became distorted or imprisioned in one or
 other institutionalized form, and as a result, contrary traditions were
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 sometimes born in a spirit, or ethos of indignation. Thus, it becomes
 clear that dialogue, as a passionate interest in the fraternity and
 reconciliation of mankind, cannot permit itself to be dogmatic.
 Dialogue builds a distinct ethos of its own.
 Dialogue, contrary to popular conception, may be marked by long
 periods of silence; an alert, listening silence, on the part of the person
 who actually lives it. One is silent but alert when one is seriously
 reading. One then has questions to put to the author one has read,
 arising from what the book has said to one's self-understanding. The
 answers may be slow in coming from the book or from the tradition
 in which one was reading, and they may come in the form of further
 questions, but rarely do they fail to come. If one says to a book T
 take your point' and thinks no more of it, then it is difficult to see how
 this can be anything but a failure to hear what the book sought to
 say. Yet, what is achieved in much of what regularly passes for
 dialogue is something of this kind. In every encounter with tradition,
 a voice from tradition seeks to say something to us and asks a
 genuine response from us. Similarly in our encounters with other
 people. Traditions of various kinds, including avant-garde ones,
 continually address us in our everyday dealings with each other. They
 invariably provoke a response in us. Recalling the analogy of the text
 however I should prefer to say: they seek a response from us. In
 making such a response, one's personal culture, including one's
 critical faculties come into play.
 The exercise of one's critical faculties reveals in effect, much about
 the character of one's personal culture and disposition. What needs
 attention here, therefore, is the manner of one's response, just as
 much as, or even more than, the substance of one's response. This is
 particularly so wherever it is a case of a response in interpersonal
 affairs, rather than a response to a text by a remote or deceased
 author. The manner of one's response in an interpersonal exchange
 influences directly the ethos which thereby arises, and influences
 accordingly the attitude which others will take to the substance of
 one's response. The manner of a response may often reveal a disposi
 tion where petulance, indignation, self-righteousness, partisanship,
 non-committal custodianship or other uninviting attribute is to the
 fore. In such circumstances the substance of one's observations,
 contained in the response, is unlikely to win much by way of accept
 ance or sympathy. The ethos brought into being by the manner of the
 response is simply the wrong kind of ethos for the advancement of
 mutual understanding. This is equally true of classroom, staffroom,
 or boardroom.
 In the conduct of our daily affairs, and not least in the conduct of
 education, there may often appear to be compelling reasons for the
 vindication of responses such as those listed. As far as dialogue is
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 concerned however, the exercise of its own critical faculties ? though
 in no way dismissive of the substance of any response ? yet detects in
 all such manners of response the death-knell of trust and the eclipse
 of community in human intercourse. With this awareness, we begin
 to see more clearly the uniqueness and the vulnerability of the ethos
 which dialogue brings into bjeing. The proper elucidation of this ethos
 is a task for sustained and disciplined thinking. It indicates in a
 preliminary way a pathway which any thinking genuinely described
 as educational might fruitfully explore.
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